Ethical dilemmas that come to public attention show how difficult medical practice can be. There are no easy answers to the problems raised. Many people over the years have tried to contribute to the process by which ethical decisions are made in medicine, but in general the end result of all this thought has been of little practical value to the busy doctor. New life support techniques have produced new dilemmas for society and the medical profession to solve. We now have a plethora of guidelines.
It is customary for ethicists to talk in terms of four principles of beneficence, non maleficence, autonomy and justice1. The emphasis these days tends to be on autonomy i.e. the wishes of the individual patient. For the doctor the principle ‘First do no harm’ is vital. We also need to remember the basic maxim ‘Thou shalt not kill’.
It is fashionable at present to consider 'therapeutic decisions' at the end of life in terms of benefits, burdens and best interests. These B words trip off the tongue in discussion, but do not stand up to careful scrutiny, as theologian Peter Jeffery2 has demonstrated in a closely argued chapter in his recent book ‘Going against the stream.’ Jeffery argues that the starting point in any discussion on foregoing treatment must be respect for life. To be of practical value ethical frameworks must be workable, understandable, realistic and universally applicable. This is a tall order, but having ruled out solutions based on substituted judgement, or quality of life assessments, Jeffery favours a framework based on the concept of proportionality, which some people may find helpful. Decisions based on substituted judgement, i.e. on the view of a proxy decision maker or other third party, as to what an incapacitated person’s wishes might be, are known to be flawed. Decisions made on quality of life judgements by third parties are also inherently flawed, and in America such judgements are not allowed as a legal reason for discontinuing treatment, according to Jeffery. This means, notes Jeffery, that health professionals can only make quality of treatment judgements, and not quality of life judgements, otherwise the acts are a disguised form of euthanasia3. The same danger is apparent when the patient’s 'best interest' is invoked as a reason for withdrawing life supportive measures.
Jeffery argues that the concept that a treatment can be withdrawn because it is ‘conferring no benefit’ is so broad that it could be applied to anyone incurably ill with a fatal condition4. There are also objections to the burden argument, for as Jeffery points out, ‘what is a burden to one person is quite acceptable to the next.’ Widening the concept to include the burden on the family, insurance company or state is anathema to most physicians whose prime responsibility is to the individual patient. However such considerations cannot be ignored completely. When resources are finite, the needs of other patients on the waiting list may enter the equation. Thus it is easy to see why some elderly incurable patients may be seen as expendable.
It will be readily apparent that every case will be different, and must be considered carefully and with sensitivity, taking into account the clinical situation and the views and wishes of the patient. When the patient is confused, unconscious or mentally in competent, the views of their nearest and dearest friends and relatives should be sought. It is the doctor's role to advise and offer appropriate treatment, which a competent patient may accept or refuse. When the patient is mentally incompetent, the burden of responsibility is more onerous, and treatment can be given only if it is strictly necessary. Those who look to the law to safeguard the interests of mentally incompetent patients may be sadly disappointed.
When all is said and done, the advice of the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics still has much to recommend it. After careful deliberation in 1993/94 in response to the Bland case, they concluded that it should be unnecessary to consider the withdrawal of hydration or nutrition unless the means of administration was in itself a burden to the patient 5. That eminently sensible conclusion was not available to the Law Lords in their judgement in the case of Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, for they allowed Tony Bland, a patient in a permanent vegetative state, to die6. I doubt whether their Lordships realised at the time how wide the repercussions of their judgement in that case would be.
Factors that spin on the wheel of fortune to determine the patient's fate.
| Clinical diagnosis |
| Treatment available |
| Patient's physical condition |
| Patient's mental state |
| Benefits and burdens of treatment |
| Patient's best interest |
| Patient's wishes |
| Relatives views |
| Views of senior clinician and clinical team. |
| Views of a Court under some circumstances. |
For practical purpose when considering whether artificial hydration or nutrition is appropriate the responsible doctor should consider the following basic points:-